In recent years, research efforts have been made to develop safe and secure environments for ARM platform. The new ARMv8 architecture brought in security features by design. However, there are still some security problems with ARMv8. For example, on Cortex-A series, there are risks that the system is vulnerable to sidechannel attacks. One major category of side-channel attacks utilizes cache memory to obtain a victim's secret information. In the cache based side-channel attacks, an attacker measures a sequence of cache operations to obtain a victim's memory access information, deriving more sensitive information. The success of such attacks highly depends on accurate information about the victim's cache accesses. In this paper, we describe an innovative approach to defend against side-channel attack on Cortex-A series chips. We also considered the side-channel attacks in the context of using TrustZone protection on ARM. Our adaptive noise injection can significantly reduce the bandwidth of side-channel while maintaining an affordable system overhead. The proposed defense mechanisms can be used on ARM Cortex-A architecture. Our experimental evaluation and theoretical analysis show the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed defense.
Introduction
In recent years, there is a rising trend on types of threats targeting to Internet of Things(IoT) devices. Some mobile devices based on ARM chips are also vulnerable to those threats. In the first step, some research studied the last-level cache(LLC) threats on both single device and in cloud with multiple devices [1] [2] [3] [4] . These attacks are very effective to extract users' private information without administrator's privileges. When setting up side channel attacks, an attacker collects the information of the victim's performance, power consumption, timing, etc. The collected information can be used to further derive more information about the victim, e.g., cryptographic keys, data being accessed, and so on.
For example, memory access time can be very different depending on if the accessed data is in the cache. Thus, the data being accessed by the victim can be partially derived based on the data access time if the attacker and the victim are sharing data in the cache.
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on commodity computer systems. Software solutions include software diversity transform [17] , adding noise into the application [18, 20, 21] , isolation through better scheduling [22] , and others. However, most of the solutions are application specific and incur substantial performance overhead.
However, these solutions are not perfectly set up for ARM platform. For example, when exiting from TrustZone, cache is not flushed, causing possible threats targeting to cache. On the other hand, if we plan to FLUSH cache for those TrustZonerelated instructions, we must consider the balance among performance overhead, security concerns and quality of the connection through cache. However, we cannot simply port (or apply) x86 defense techniques [23] [24] [25] on ARM platform directly.
As mentioned above, LLC based side-channel attacks and defenses are mainly implemented and evaluated on the x86 architecture. While more and more mobile devices, smart phones, and IoT devices mainly use ARM architecture rather than x86. Whether the side-channel attacks and defense mechanism are the same on the ARM based devices are not fully investigated.
On the ARM architecture, it is very different to construct side-channel attacks and defense mechanisms. For example, on an ARM platform, a cache flush operation is a privileged operation. It is a more secure design than x86 since a regular user has no access to cache FLUSH operations. Furthermore, when flush instructions are requested, the system can invalidate the cache contents and FLUSH all the TLB entries, making LLC based side-channel attacks impossible, while considerable performance loss is introduced at the same time.
In this paper, we describe an innovative approach to LLC based side-channel attacks on the ARM architecture and propose a defense mechanism for ARM Cortex-A architecture. We use adaptive FLUSH operations on some system operations, as well as the feedback of performance monitor. We carefully add cache operations to the system such that the measurement of the victim's memory access time becomes very difficult or even impossible. As a result, the bandwidth of the side channel is significantly reduced, making the attacker unable to compromise the device with an acceptable cost. We implement and evaluate the proposed defense on Cortex-A series chips. The experimental results show that our proposed defense is effective in both mitigating the cache-based side-channel attacks and supporting efficient execution of normal applications.
The design and implementation of defense have to overcome several challenges. First, on ARM architecture, there are different banked registers and modes. Flush+Reload operations are designed as privileged operations but they are supported by TrustZone in different ways. We will look at both the threat and defense in such context. Second, we target at protection of the whole system instead of a specific application while providing affordable overheads. Most existing software solutions are either specific to an application or have substantial overhead. Third, it is challenging to adaptively inject FLUSH operations with affordable overhead to the system and normal applications.
In summary, our paper has the following contributions:
• We investigate the cache-based side-channel attacks on ARM architecture, with or without TrustZone protection.
• We design and implement a defense mechanism against several types of side-channel attacks on ARM platforms. The proposed defense is adaptive, effective, and efficient. The protection can work for a whole system rather than a specific application.
• We have done experimental evaluation for our protection mechanisms. The evaluation results show effectiveness and efficiency of our design.
• Our protection can be implemented in either an operation system on ARM or as a tool in more onthe-go environments.
The paper is organized in following orders. In Related Work section, we introduce recent research efforts on ARM cache security and TrustZone. In Overview section, we have a introduction to our defense model and working mechanism. In Design and Implementation section, we introduce some technical details about our defense model. After that, we have sets of experiments to test the efficiency and performance of the defense. We discuss in both theoretically and experimentally in Evaluation and Discussion sections. Then we have our conclusions and briefly plan the future work.
Related Work

Cache-based Covert Channels
A covert channel can be created through sharing resources. The higher bandwidth is in the cover channel, the faster the information leakage can achieve. Ristenpart et al. [26] experimented with L2 covert channels in a cloud environment. Their bandwidth is around 0.2 bps. Xu et al. [27] extended this attack. The capacity of L2 cover channel is 233 bps. Percival demonstrated that shared access to memory caches provides a high bandwidth covert channel between threads in [28] . The capacity of L2 covert channel is approximately 100 kbps. Wu et al. [29] [19] .
By accurately mapping the cache sets, our attack achieves a much higher bandwidth than prior work.
Last-level Cache(LLC) Side-Channel Attacks
Due to the low channel capacity, an LLC-based sidechannel typically only leaks course-grain information. For example, the attacks of Ristenpart et al. [26] leak information about co-residency, traffic rates and keystroke timing. Zhang et al. [30] use an L2 sidechannel to detect non-cooperating co-resident VMs. Our attack improves on this work by achieving a high granularity that enables leaking of cryptographic keys. Yarom and Falkner (FLUSH+RELOAD) [1] show that when attacker and victim share memory, e.g. shared libraries, the technique of Gullasch et al. [31] can achieve an efficient crossVM, cross-core, LLC attack. Side-channel attack removes the requirement for sharing memory, and is powerful enough to recover the key from the latest GnuPG crypto software which uses the more advanced 618 sliding window technique for modular exponentiation, which is impossible using FLUSH+RELOAD attacks. In concurrent work Irazoqui et al. [32] describe the use of large pages for mounting a synchronous LLC PRIME+PROBE attack against the last round of AES.
Recently, many research work on side-channel attacks in a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), such as Intel SGX and ARM Trustzone [33, 34] . There are some other types of side-channel attacks based on different shared data or data structures in the system. For example, Xu et al. [35] introduced controlledchannel attacks, a new type of side-channel attack. The attack allows an untrusted operating system to extract large amounts of sensitive information from protected applications on systems, such as Overshadow [36] , InkTag [37] , or Haven [38] . This attack is not based on LLC, but based on the page accessed by the VMs. Our techniques do not apply directly to these attacks but the idea of noise injection can still be used theoretically.
Basically, the difference between a covert channel and a side-channel is the role of the attacker side. In a covert channel, the attacker trying to get the encrypted message can be either side of the channel, possibly the sender or the receiver. However, in a side-channel, the attacker is on a third side, trying to listen to the message channel to steal information. Both the sender and the receiver can be unaware of the existence of the malicious user.
Manipulating Cache Contents
Two types of LLC-based side-channels have been extensively studied recently. One is the Flush+Reload [1] [2] [3] [4] , and the other is Prime+Probe [4, 19, 32] . In Flush+Reload, the attacker and victim share a physical memory page, such as sharing libraries. In [30] , the adversary was able to conduct a cache-based attack to track the execution path of a victim and extract a secret of interest from the victim. Yarom and Falkner [1] applied the attack to recover a RSA encryption key across VMware VMs, and Irazoqui et al. [2] recovered AES keys. Prime+Probe can be conducted when the attacker and victim share the same CPU cache sets. Liu et al. presented an effective and practical implementation of the Prime+Probe side-channel attack against the last-level cache in [19] . Work [32] implemented Prime+Probe to recover AES keys in a cross-VM setting on Xen 4.1.
It is proven that the Flush+Reload technique is particularly effective when memory duplication features are enabled by the VMM [2, 4] . Gülmezoğlu et al. applied flush+reload attack on OpenSSL implementation of AES, and recovered the key in just 15 seconds working across cores in a cross-VM setting [4] . In this paper, we mainly focus on Flush+Reload technique and our proposed techniques can also be applied to Prime+Probe using the same principle.
The FLUSH and RELOAD technique is a variant of PRIME+PROBE that relies on sharing pages between the attacker and the victim processes. With shared pages, the malicious user can ensure that a specific memory line is evicted from the whole cache hierarchy. The attacker uses this to monitor access to the memory line. The attack is a variation of the technique suggested by Gullasch et al. [31] , which include adaptations to multi-core and virtualized environments.
A round of attack consists of three phases. During the first phase, the monitored memory line is flushed from the cache hierarchy. The attacker, then, waits to allow the victim time to access the memory line before the third phase. In the third phase, the attacker reloads the memory line, measuring the time to load it. If during the wait phase the victim accesses the memory line, the line will be available in the cache and the reload operation will take a short time. If, on the other hand, the victim has not accessed the memory line, the line will need to be brought from memory and the reload will take significantly longer.
The victim access can overlap the reload phase of the attacker. In such a case, the victim access will not trigger a cache fill. Instead, the victim will use the cached data from the reload phase. Consequently, the attacker will miss the access. more difficult. The proposed approach is specific to encryption application and incurs substantial performance overhead. Tromer et al. [18] suggested several countermeasures for the side channel attack, including injecting noise to the memory access pattern by adding spurious accesses, e.g., by performing a dummy encryption in parallel to the real one. This would decrease the signal visible to the attacker. However, they do not give any detailed design or implementation.
Zhang and Reiter [21] designed and implemented a defense system called Düppel that enables a tenant virtual machine to defend itself from cache-based side-channel attacks in public clouds. A tenant can automatically inject additional noise into the timings that an attacker might observe from caches. Since these timings are commonly used by an attacker to infer the sensitive information about a victim VM, injecting noise into them will generally make the attacks more difficult. The solution requires users to identify the particular processes that should be protected [39] . Our approach generally protects the system and does not need user to identify any specific process.
Other Types of Defense
Zhou et al. [39] proposed a memory copy approach to dynamically manage physical memory pages shared between security domains to disable sharing of LLC lines, preventing Flush+Reload side channels via LLCs. In their proposed work, a victim's access to its copy will be invisible to an attacker's Reload in a Flush+Reload attack. Varadarajan et al. [22] investigated a soft isolation, reducing the risk of sharing through better scheduling design. It is also possible to limit the frequency of potentially dangerous interactions between mutually untrustworthy programs [40] .
Compared with the above work, our approach is easy to deploy and effective, and provides protection to an entire system rather than a specific application. Moreover, all the above defense systems are implemented on x86 platform. Our work is focusing on the LLC-based attack and defense on both ARM architecture.
Recent Research on ARM-based Defenses
On the year 2017, Sandro Pinto and some other researchers proposed LTZVisor [41] , which is based on TrustZone to protect and assist ARM virtualization. They implement and test on ARM platform and have an overhead of around 22% at the highest user switching frequency. Guan el al. proposed TrustShadow [42] , using TrustZone to protect user's applications, with little or no change on the application itself. The overhead here is around 10% at worst case and 2% on average. However, the framework is not tested on ARMv8-M, which has different structure and instruction sets from ARM Cortex-A series. Similar as LTZVisor, Hua et al. designed and implemented vTZ [43] , a virtualization based defense framework on ARM. The overhead of vTZ is on average case around 5%.
According to their work, the most popular solution on ARM is virtualization, using TrustZone to protect the application, data and user's private keys. This can only be implemented on ARM Cortex-A series, which has different level of cache, multiple privilege levels and powerful CPU. On ARMv8-M series, however, similar implementation is not applicable. On ARMv8-M series chips, there is no cache on the structure, and normally the protection cannot be complicated due to the limited resource on the devices. Compared with their work, we have a more directly protection, with acceptable overhead and good performance.
Overview
Background
Environment Overview As multi-core processors become pervasive and the number of on-die cores increases, a key design issue facing processor architects is the hierarchy and policies for the on-die LLC. With LLC techniques, a CPU might only need to get around 5% data from main memory, which can improve the efficiency of CPU largely. On ARM, we are using Juno r1 Development Platform which has one A57 and one A53 processors on the board. A57 has a 2M LLC on the processor.
With the increasing complexity of computing systems, as well as multiple level of memory access, some registers are designed to store some specific hardware events. These registers are usually called hardware performance counters. We have many tools getting information from those performance counters, thus getting the performance information.
In our implementation, we cannot use perf for collecting timing information of memory access on ARM, since it cannot be accurate enough, and not applicable on ARM. On this paper we use inline assemblies to measure time associated information with our side-channels.
Process Structures On implementations at ARM platform, the model contains with a sender, a receiver and an OS module to randomly inject cache flushes to generate noises into the channel. If the sender and the receiver are both from the attacker, it is a typical covert channel. If the sender program is a legitimate program, it is a typical side-channel configuration.
In this paper, a channel is constructed and evaluated. The sender here sends a message in the stream. The receiver, on the other hand, analyzes the access time to the memory shared with the sender to figure out what is being sent. After receiver receiving the message, we study the quality of such channel in terms of bandwidth, accuracy with noises injections to the message channel.
We also have the error correction in the message channel. On this paper, we use CRC for this purpose. The message passed through the message channel are checked using CRC, and when noises injected, the receiver uses CRC to try fixing the message, working to recover the message that the sender is sending.
Attack Based on ARM Platform Attacks using shared resource based side-channels need to monitor the victim's activities on the shared resource. Using cache as an example, in a Flush+Reload attack, the attacker firstly Flushes specific cache lines, and waits for a predetermined time to Reload the contents. By measuring the reload time, the attacker can learn if the shared contents with the victim have been used or not, thus deriving sensitive information about the victim.
Similarly, in a Prime+Probe attack, the attacker first measures the data reading time, and loads memory contents (Prime) to a number of cache sets. The attacker then measures the access time to see if the data is accessed by the others (Probe). The success of such sidechannel attacks is highly depending on the following three necessary conditions: (1) the ability to precisely measure the memory access time; (2) the ability to selectively manipulate cache contents; and (3) sharing memory contents with the victim.
On both x86 and ARM architecture, there are performance counter registers and related machine instructions to obtain accurate time measurement to satisfy condition (1). Condition (3) can be easily satisfied since a modern operating system has a lot of shared memory pages through the shared libraries, code segments, etc. The challenge is to satisfy condition (2) on ARM architecture because the instructions to manipulate cache contents are privileged instructions that are not available to the regular users. If a user is at a privileged level, side-channel attacks are unnecessary. Thus, ARM architecture is secure by design if a single operating system is running on the processor. However, these support on ARM may open the door to sidechannel attacks due to handling of cache operations.
Background on Different Structures of ARM As mentioned above, on this paper, we focus on ARM Cortex-A structure. However, devices and users using ARM Cortex-M structure are in a rising trend of numbers. On ARMv8-M, it does not have cache and memory mapping. Instead, it uses direct allocation on memory to ensure high performance. The memory on ARMv8-M is separated into different parts for different purposes.
As a result, the TrustZone entry and exit operations are with high efficiency, costing less than 10% of clock cycles comparing with Cortex-A series. On the other hand, the design of ARMv8-M made it difficult for design of defense. As devices using this structure usually with a simple or almost no OS, traditional defense framework are not applicable on those devices.
Based on our experiments and discussions, we can only focus on Cortex-A defense. For Cortex-M based defending framework, we focus on that topic on some other paper.
Threat Model and Assumptions
Side-channel attackers and other cache-based attackers are not based on compromised OS. They perform as 'man in the middle' and collecting time stamps of cache read/write operations. As discussed above, for side-channel attack, the processes do not need shared memory, so the model here has no assumption that they have to share memory in whole or in part. Because of the difference in the definition between side-channel and covert channel, on covert channel, it is possible that the attacker and victim share some resources, making a slight difference on the assumption. In our design of defense, we can efficiently decrease the bandwidth of both side-channel and covert channel, but we are testing the defense using side-channel attack model, so we assume that the memory is not shared between victim process and the attacker.
On system side, we assume that the operating system components in TrustZone is not compromised so that the attackers are forced to use covert channels or side channels without explicitly violating access control policies enforced by the operating system or other protection mechanisms. Besides that, we also assume the system is having a control part, i.e. handler to inject interference into possible side-channel. Some instructions using assembly code is privileged to higher level to launch, so we assume they have the privilege level to inject noise. On the other hand, we assume that the noise injection process is not compromised, so the injection of noise is just for the defense, not for other malicious using like probing the cache.
We also assume that the attacker has sufficient privilege to access the memory access time. This is also needed for the covert channel, and for the performance analysis of the covert channel. Time measurement is the key to launch most popular cache attacks, like Flush+Reload attack, Prime+Probe attack, etc. The attackers collect the time stamps and process them locally to retrieve information. To ensure accuracy, the attacker have the access to consult with several 5 EAI 
Design and Implementation
Design Features
On devices with ARM chips, security design can be quite different from the same case on Desktop or even mobile phones. We even have to think about the difference with traditional design on ARM utilizing TrustZone. In this part, we analyze our design features, challenges and show how our design fit for the new ARM devices.
According to our design goal, we need to make sure the security framework we design is flexible. It should be easy to port from device to device, despite the function or the use of each device. For example, if the secure handler we design and implement is porting from a smart home monitor to a series of smart vehicles, we have to ensure the manufacturer is doing as little as they wish to make the system fit in to the new environment. On Desktop and other PCs, it is relatively easier because of the standard OS and capsuled interfaces. However, on ARM devices, we get very little from the OS, so we have to implement the flexibility within our framework.
The next critical issue for the ARM devices is power consumption. With the consideration of that, we have to discuss the need of the presentence of TrustZone once again. Although doing every implementation in TrustZone is simple and easy, it is not the best energyefficient solution sometimes. To this target, we try to use the privilege level of ARM to work like TrustZone and thus cut down the energy cost. Energy is not a serious problem in the devices like smart home devices and smart cars, as they can easily recharge. However, it is a problem in some other devices like outdoor devices and wear-on devices. This makes it another challenging part of our design and implementation. The paging difference is also a challenge to our work.
Given the design of the project, we do not depend on the Hypervisor mode of ARM structure, and not rely on TrustZone protections.
Overview of our design is shown at Figure 1 . In this figure, we use 1 to 5 to indicate different steps of a side-channel attack and the defense we design against to it. An attacker can utilize the cache to launch sidechannel attack, i.e. Flush+Reload attack, shown as step 1. To effectively defend against the side-channel threat, we use Flush injection to cut down the bandwidth of the side-channel. On step 2, the noise injector sends cache FLUSH request, and connect with system components on step 3. Then, the cache is FLUSHed as step 5, and send some performance parameters to the monitor in noise injector as step 4. After the whole loop, the monitor can decide whether the injector should send 
Adaptive Control Model
Based on the design of defense model using FLUSH operations introduced above, we must find some balance between bandwidth elimination and performance overhead. As sometimes we need better performance and ignore minor bandwidth effects, we need to have some adaptive and flexible controlling methods to keep the balance of performance and security. As a result, we design a monitor between the noise injector and the OS. The designed architecture is shown on Figure 2 .
For the monitor, we can set up different parameters of each category, and decide the FLUSH requests to the injector.
Implementations
In this section, we introduce some implementation details in the defense. On ARMv8 with TrustZone, the noise injector can send cache operation requests to the system, and system components can handle them and FLUSH cache for their needs. We control the frequency of FLUSH operations, and thus keeping a balance of security and performance. For the structure we implement, the most critical parts are accurate time stamp collection, and cache FLUSH operation. For the non-secure world, as the users do not need to change their non-secure code, we do not need special care of them. For accurate time recording, it is needed for the analysis of bandwidth, and performance overhead. For cache FLUSH operation, it is the key to ensure the cache not going to be utilized by attackers.
Cache FLUSH Operations on ARM Platform. In order to add noises into the message channel, we consider having additional cache FLUSH operations. We use the third process to randomly add cache FLUSH operations, which do not target at some specific programs. As a result, these noise injections can be considered to protect the whole system. Implementing the FLUSH operation on x86 platform is straightforward using clf lush instruction, but more complicated operations are on ARM platform for that.
As discussed above, on ARM, users have no access permission to cache FLUSH operations, as these operations are at privileged level. To better researching on the defense strategy on ARM, we build a message channel across the processes. However, on ARM platform, we do not have the instructions like clflush on x86 that are straightforward to deal with cache FLUSH operations. As a result, we have to take a look at the cache allocation on ARM, and use inline assembly codes to implement cache FLUSH operations.
There are two types of cache allocation on ARM: 1) read-allocate cache, and 2) write-allocate cache. When operating on cache with WRITE, if the cache is missed, CPU will simply put the data into main memory. Prefetching happens only with READ operations. However, when writing data with cache misses, pre-fetching will happen and CPU will read the corresponding places in cache and start to WRITE. On ARMv8 architecture, the processor uses C7 register of CP15 to implement cache and write buffer operations.
It is usual to clean the cache before flushing it, so the external memory is updated with any dirty data. The following code segment shows how to clean and flush the entire cache.
MOV r0 , #0 ; C l e a r R0 ; MCR p15 , 0 , r15 , c7 , c10 , 3 ; // Flush DCache ; On ARMv7 or higher, the cache FLUSH operations that are privileged and can be handled by ARM. In the code above, we can see the assembling code of flushing the cache uses MCR (Move to Coprocessor from Registers). The privileged operation using this can be trapped by the system, and system handles the operation referring to it. The reason is that, when an instruction uses MCR or MRC, the registers CP14 and CP15 are taken access. These registers are designed by ARM with special purpose, and used only for cache maintenance. For ARM, it has a system call which takes an array of those operations each specified by the struct called mmuext_op. This call allows access to various operations which must be performed with privileged level, like TLB operations, cache operations, and loading descriptor table base addresses.
Time Measurement on ARMv8. Unlike performance counters on x86, on ARMv8 platform, there are no instructions like perf to collect time-related performance counters from the system layer. Another challenge is that we cannot use rdtsc instruction to get time stamps as we often do on x86. Additionally, some other coarse-grained way like gettimeof day() certainly does not work.
Given these limitations, we have to be back to hardware, and look at ARM structure itself. We look up ARM whitebook and find some registers that we can retrieve time stamp information. However, when consulting with these registers, we have to enable them from kernel mode. By default, the access to these registers are disabled.
The following code segment shows the instructions for calculating time:
ISB ; MRS %0, c n t v c t _ e l 0 ; // p r o c e s s e x e c u t i o n ; ISB ; MRS %0, c n t v c t _ e l 0 ; ISB ; MRS %0, c n t f r q _ e l 0 ;
We store the timestamps in two arrays and calculate the time based on these raw data. The instructions are privileged, and we can use timestamps for many monitor jobs. cntf rq_el0 is used for reading current running frequency, which is not always the CPU frequency or clock frequency.
Monitors Setup
On Overview section, we introduce the structure of adaptive defense design. It is critical for the defense to have proper monitors in order to provide accurate performance and overhead information feedback data. The challenge of the work is the difference between platforms of ARM and x86. On x86 chips, some system tools like perf can directly present what is going on to the system. On ARMv8-A, however, we have to look up for right registers and use MRS or MSR instructions to read out system performance data. After that, we use some calculations to show the conditions of performance overhead, cache miss rate and bandwidth.
Performance Monitor Units ARMv8-A structure provides various Performance Monitor Units (PMUs) to 7 EAI Endorsed Transactions on Security and Safety 01 2019 -01 2019 | Volume 6 | Issue 19 | e1 store system running condition data. In our implementations, we basically use instructions MRS and MSR to collect data from register P MEV CN T R0_EL0, which is a 32-bit performance monitor counter register, and register P MEV T Y P ER0_EL0 register, which is used for setting up events to be counted. With events shown as Table 1 , we can calculate current cache miss rate.
Performance Benchmark For ARMv8-A series, ARM has a set of benchmark tools called CoreMark [44] .
This benchmark is open-source and fit for features on ARM platform. During the defense, we can modify CoreMark to report performance overhead, in order to work as a monitor that supports adaptive feedback to noise injections. In particular, we modify core_matrix.c, core_state.c and other source files to report current overhead of the system with running defense.
Bandwidth Monitor Similar to cache miss rate calculation, we cannot directly find data from registers to have bandwidth feedback. However, when we are executing victim and attacker processes, system read and write rates are also showing in different values. As a point of work, we utilize the system read and write rates to calculate bandwidth. Other references for the calculation are the frequencies of the core Cortex-A53 and Cortex-A57.
With the help of PMUs, benchmark tools and related instructions, we can setup adaptive monitors to watch the performance, bandwidth and cache miss rate information of the system. In fact, with more PMUs being utilized, we can setup more monitors to have better control over the noise injections. These can be some additional tasks to work on in the future.
Other Implementations. Besides these, we also have other implementation features on this defense framework.
We use Error Correction Code (ECC) to try recovering the contents missed due to quality loss. In this paper we use CRC code to work as a checking and correcting process to try recovering the message that the sender just puts into the message channel. That is possible because the attacker may use some ECC to recover the data.
CRC is widely used in digital networks, and storage devices to detect abnormal data due to accidental changes to original data. At CRC, data are packed into blocks with a short check value attached, based on the remainder of a polynomial division of the contents of each block. CRC is popular in network applications because it is simple to implement, easy to analyze the data package from the check value, and good at detecting noise in message transmission channels.
However, CRC and other error correction codes have limitations. When we inject noise beyond a threshold, error correction may not work well, with some cases even performing worse and cannot correct the message according to the checksums. In our experiments, we add much noise into the message channel to defend against the attacker. As a result, CRC performs not well when the noise is injected for too much. It supports the noise injection mechanism for effective defense, as the attacker cannot even use ECC to recover original data.
We also implement a loop to control the frequency of FLUSH operations. The frequency is decided based on the performance monitor. Therefore, the total amount and frequency of noise injection are controlled in the protection side.
Evaluation
Experimental Setup and Metrics
In this paper, we have different sets of experiments, testing the effectiveness of Flush-based adaptive defense. According to the experimental results, we have discussions on ARM Cortex-A series.
For Experiments, we target on two core problems: TrustZone and cache threats. For TrustZone experiments, we have experiments on following aspects:
• Percentage of TrustZone-related instructions;
• Cost of entering/exiting TrustZone;
• Effectiveness of TrustZone by bandwidth.
For cache threats, the major threat we focus on this paper is side-channel attack. We have experiments on the following aspects:
• We FLUSH cache while exiting TrustZone and test the effectiveness;
• Cost of FLUSH operations;
• Effectiveness of FLUSH operations by bandwidth.
We also have theoretical discussions based on the experimental results. We have three aspects of theoretical analysis:
• We discuss bandwidth effect of FLUSH operations by theory;
• We discuss overhead effect of FLUSH operations by theory;
• We discuss defense performance by entropy.
For the first two aspects of discussion, we use curve regression to match the experimental results and theoretical discussions. 
Experimental Results
We evaluate our proposed defense mechanisms using a proof-of-concept implementation on ARMv8 Platform. On ARM, we use a Juno r1 Development Platform, with one A57, one A53, the cache of L1 48KB for instruction, 32KB for data, and L2 for 2MB.
Cost of Interaction with ARM TrustZone.
On ARM Cortex-A Platform, an instruction smc is used for connecting the secure world and non-secure world. While in normal non-secure world, some code could call privileged smc instruction. Then, secure world monitor will be triggered after validation. After execution of secure code, the return of the execution also calls smc to get back to the normal world. There are many opensource test platform to measure the world switch latency, and in this experiment, we use the wellknown QEMU to test. It had been developed since the first patch published in 2011, and been patched by many manufacturers including Samsung, utilizing ARM TrustZone for security design.
QEMU with ARM TrustZone provides us a variety of tests. The tests behave as we users initiating secure operations from user mode. The test functions validate the TrustZone features of QEMU, and utilizing the features of the functions themselves. We have tests on read/write from non-secure world to secure world and vice versa. The results are shown as Table 2 shows.
We also write a script based on the above write/read code. In the script, there is a loop called in and runs several times as a workload. We use Ubuntu 16.10 as the normal world OS, with 26 processes running on background, including the workload we use for testing. We count the smc-related instructions that belongs to TrustZone-related operations, and analyze the attributions of them. According to our test, the instructions takes up less than 6% of the total instructions running, with these three different categories as shown on Table 3 .
In normal using conditions, however, the manufacturers are not using TrustZone that often. Thus, the test here can be the upper bound or 'worst case' of the utilization of TrustZone-Related instructions. Normally, the non-secure world does not have to call in the secure world too often. Noise Injection to F +R based Side-Channels on ARMv8. As we described in Overview, on ARM platform with TrustZone protection, ARM can provide some protection for the cache against side-channel attack on the cache, using cache invalidation. However, it introduces significant performance loss. We revised implementation such that the amount of cache invalidation is under our control. Figure 3 shows the experimental results for a Flush+Reload based sidechannel.
In the figure, x-axis is the percentage of cache operations passing through the system handling. In other words, it is the percentage of cache operations that run on the processor hardware directly rather than being ignored. y-axis on the left is the performance speedup and y-axis on the right is the bandwidth of the side channel. If 0 percent cache operations passes through ARM handing, the bandwidth of the side channel will be 0 and we set the corresponding execution time as the base value for the speedup measurement. When we have more cache operations passing through the ARM handling, we can get better performance on the execution. However, the bandwidth of the side channel goes up as well. According to the experimental results, when we increase the percentage of cache operations passing through ARM handing, the bandwidth of potential side-channels in the whole platform will increase quickly up to 650 bits/second which is very practical and useful for side-channel attacks. At the same time, we can have performance improvement up to 43%. However, we do not want such kind of performance improvement due to the security risks of side-channel attacks. The trade-off must be chosen between a non-practical bandwidth of sidechannel and acceptable performance improvement.
Noise Injection to P +P based Side-Channels on ARMv8. Similarly, when we inject flush operations to a system, it can also affect the bandwidth of Prime+Probe based side-channels. In our experiments, when we inject flush operations to incur about 20% overhead, the bandwidth of a side-channel can be decreased from about 600 bps to only several bps. The flush operations can effectively interfere with the time measurement in Prime+Probe based side-channels, thus making it nonpractical. Figure 4 shows the experimental results of noise injection into a Prime+Probe based side-channel. In the figure, x-axis is the percentage of cache operations passing through ARM handling. y-axis on the left is the performance speedup and y-axis on the right is the bandwidth of the side channel. The configuration of the experiment is the same as the Flush+Reload based side-channel except the type of side-channel is Prime+Probe. In the figure, we can see the different impact on speedup of the running of the program and bandwidth of side-channels caused by different percentage of passing-through cache operations from the injector process. When we pass-through more cache operations of a process (not trapped by the ARM platform and invalidate cache lines) we can see the speedup of an application increases, but also with increasing risks of side-channel attacks, as shown by fast increasing bandwidth of side-channels.
On ARM, as shown in Figure 4 , when the ratio of not trapped cache operations increases to be about 10%, the bandwidth of side-channels quickly rises up to more than 200 bps, with speedup rising for only 13%. When the ratio increases to 75%, the bandwidth of side-channels rises up to more than 700 bps, with the speedup of application only by 35%. As a result, we can see that enabling ARM to pass-through some cache operations is not affordable, with very high risks of leaking information through side-channels. In other words, the way ARM handles the cache operations by processes is necessary to ensure security given the performance overheads. Otherwise, there will be greatly increased risks to have side-channel attacks on ARM platform.
Discussion
Theoretical Analysis
In this section, we describe theoretical analysis on the quality of the side-channels and also the impact of noise injections.
Information Theory based Analysis. The Shannon entropy [45] of a random variable X : K → χ is defined in Equation 1 .
The entropy is a lower bound of the average number of bits required for representing the results of independent repetitions of the experiment associated with X. In terms of our model, the entropy H(X) is a lower bound of the effective information provided by one bit of the message.
Using our experimental results on ARM as an example, the accuracy at the receiver side with different level of noise injection is shown in Table 4 . Note that we are using noise ratio as a parameter, which is a ratio of flush operations compared with all cache operations. We use srand() to generate random numbers, so the distribution of the flush operations are of normal distribution. The entropy of the side channel has a relation with accuracy of the bits received through the side channel. Thus, we calculate the entropy as follows.
In our analysis, we set the value of b as 2 to calculate the entropy in bits. Now we consider multiple test cases. In each test, we use an ε to measure the percentage of noise injected in the test. Then, we calculate H(X) and H(Y ), which are the entropy of the sender and the receiver respectively. As discussed before, the probability for the sender to send a 0 equals to the probability of sending an 1 for a random message. Thus, we could use the following equations to calculate the quality of message channel with noise injected.
And we have the results with different noise injections ε, as shown in Table 5 .
In the table, with a relatively high amount noise added into the side-channels, the entropy rises up quickly. It is close to the max value of 1 with around 50% operations added. When we add more noise, it makes the receiver harder to guess a bit from the sender. Therefore, when we have a probability close to 0.5 to fail, the entropy will have the highest value of 1.
Channel Quality.
With different level of noise injection, a side-channel constructed by an attacker can be from highly risky to almost non-threatening. As discussed above, with the random injection of flush operations, the values of message entropy, the bandwidth and overhead are changed accordingly, as shown in Table 6 .
In the table, with the noise injected, both message entropy and overhead increase, while the bandwidth of side-channels decreases quickly. With more noise injected into the channel, it makes the channel filled in with additional noise, the entropy value increases.
As shown by Shannon entropy definition, when the entropy is close to 1, the message channel can be considered as very poor quality. For each bit with two possible values, the expected time of guesses for getting the correct bit is close to 2, which is nearly a situation with random guessing. If we have such kind of message channel, it cannot send meaningful message because of the difficulty for the receiver to get the corresponding bits.
However, the injected noises also have some negative impact on the system, which is shown as overhead in our experiments. There is a tradeoff between performance sacrifice and increasing of security. On ARM platform, we can achieve effective defense using flush operations injected into the system, with the performance overhead of about 20%, to effectively defend against the side-channel.
Statistical Discussion. Now we consider the bandwidth of side-channels in Figure 3 again. In the experiments where we randomly insert flush operations to interfere with the side-channels, the time of injecting noise is randomly distributed. Also, the interval of each pair of operations is randomly distributed. Exponential distribution is usually used to describe the distribution of intervals of a set of statistically independent events. In our experiment, we use it to describe the distribution of injected flush operations intervals. Every time the system flushes the cache, it affects the time measurement of the side-channel attacks.
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When we look at the side-channel bandwidth, another factor we have to consider is the background noise from other running processes in the system. We model the system background noise using a uniform distribution. Therefore, the cumulative distribution function is as follows:
Where λ is the rate parameter of exponential distribution. As we focus on the bandwidth with given ratio of passing-through cache FLUSH operations, there cannot be the situation where x is less than 0. As mentioned above, we have to take the background noise into consideration. Thus, we have the function with more parameters as follows:
Where a is the maximum possible bandwidth under our experimental environments and b is the parameters of background noise. Based on our experimental results and the above statistical analysis, we have a curve fitting function shown in Figure 5 .
The function with parameters determined by experimental results is as follows. 
The function is used as a reference for adaptive noise injection and side-channel bandwidth prediction in the defense.
Adaptive Noise Injection
In the defense against the side-channels, we consider three critical system parameters: performance overhead, bandwidth of the possible side-channel, and the cache miss-rate. In our design, when the performance overhead is over a given threshold, or the cache miss rate is over a pre-determined threshold, noise injection will be stopped to maintain an acceptable performance. However, when the bandwidth of possible side-channels is high enough at a risky level, noise injection will be enabled to protect the system against side-channels. We have conducted two sets of experiments to compare adaptive noise injection with simple random noise injection. In each set of the experiments, we compare the overhead of the system or the bandwidth of the side-channels. In the first set of experiments, we control the cache miss rate and performance overhead, and see the bandwidth differences between defense with and without the adaptive mechanism. In the second sets of experiments, we control the bandwidth and cache miss rate, and compare the performance overhead between defense with and without adaptive mechanism. The experimental results are shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7 .
In Figure 6 , the column on the left shows the experimental results for the adaptive defense. We set up the threshold of cache miss rate to 50%, the performance overhead to 20% and bandwidth to 20 bps. When the cache miss rate is less than 50%, and the performance overhead is less than 20%, we add cache flush operations to interfere with the sidechannels. According to the experimental results, when adaptive noise injection is used, the average bandwidth of the side-channels can be similar. However, we can obtain better performance while dealing with high bandwidth situations. When the cache miss-rate is relatively low and performance overhead is low, the risk of leaking information through shared resources is relatively higher. When we target at this situation and inject more noises to the system, the interference can be effective. On the other hand, when the performance overhead is high and the cache miss rate is also high, frequent cache flush operations provide a very tough situation for cache based side-channel attacks. Under such circumstance, there is little need to inject more cache operations as noises. The experiments here show the effect of our adaptive defending. Figure 7 , on the other hand, shows the results of the second set of experiments. In this set of experiments, we mainly consider the performance overhead of the defending strategy. Without adaptive noise injection, the overhead is always as high as 20%-30%. However, as some of the cache flush operations are not necessary, our adaptive noise injection can avoid a great amount of flush operations when they are not needed. As a result, when we set the noise injection threshold to the cache miss-rate of 50% and bandwidth of over 20 bps, the overhead average can be optimized to less than 20%, to be about 18.5%. As we mention the importance of efficiency in defending, this set of experiments prove that we can implement adaptive defending with good efficiency.
We use registers and a loop to work as monitors, which can be more adaptive than trapping 'sensitive' activities. We can change the parameters of the monitors according to our need, with almost no changes on other parts of the defense. It is especially feasible for ARM platform, as mobile devices have different concerns on keeping their own needs to the defense.
According to experiments above, when we set up a monitor and control the parameters according to our need, we can have better performance without too much loss on the system's cache miss rate, overhead or security concerns. For further defense design, we can have different parameters fitting into the monitor, and the user can decide which parameters they care most. As a result, the monitor can make the defense adaptive, while keeping FLUSH injections effective.
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Conclusion
It has been proved that in the side-channel attacks, the attacker can steal users' private information even if the operating system is not compromised. To counter this growing threat, we present a new softwareonly defense mechanism to mitigate the LLC based side-channel attack. Our defense randomly flushes the cache to inject noise in FLUSH+RELOAD. We qualify our defense mechanism using Shannon entropy analysis. We implement the proposed defense on ARM V8 architecture. The experimental results show that with less than 5% system performance overhead, our approach effectively lowers the accuracy of the sidechannel to around 70%. We also introduce an adaptive monitor to balance the efficiency, security concerns and performance overhead. The results show that cache flushing with adaptive strategy can effectively reduce the threats of side-channel attack, and the user can still control the defense based on their own needs.
In future work, we will investigate the ARM instructions to further reduce the overhead of current defense. We also plan to port the monitor to ARMv8-M platform. We will design and implement a defense framework for ARMv8 platform, both for ARMv8-A and ARMv8-M series. If we can implement the defense framework, we will provide a better environment for the users and developers. It will be a good protection for IoT network.
